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ABSTRACT
In this article, the core concepts in Thomas Hobbes’s framework of representation and responsibility 
are applied to the question of machine responsibility and the responsibility gap and the retribution 
gap. The method is philosophical analysis and involves the application of theories from political 
theory to the ethics of technology. A veil of complexity creates the illusion that machine actions 
belong to a mysterious and unpredictable domain, and some argue that this unpredictability absolves 
designers of responsibility. Such a move would create a moral hazard related to both (a) strategically 
increasing unpredictability and (b) taking more risk if responsible humans do not have to bear the 
costs of the risks they create. Hobbes’s theory allows for the clear and arguably fair attribution of 
action while allowing for necessary development and innovation. Innovation will be allowed as long 
as it is compatible with social order and provided the beneficial effects outweigh concerns about 
increased risk. Questions of responsibility are here considered to be political questions.
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INTRodUCTIoN
How can we attribute praise, blame, and responsibility when machines perform actions? The question 
of machine responsibility and agency is an old one, but we are still seemingly confounded by the 
complexity of new technologies. When complicated machines act, so to speak, on their own, without 
their designers being able to control or predict and fully understand their actions, can they still be 
held responsible?
In this article the core concepts in Thomas Hobbes’s framework of representation and 
responsibility are applied to the question of machine responsibility. This provides a simple and 
straightforward way of understanding the attribution of machine actions, and simultaneously narrows 
or eliminates the responsibility gap and retribution gap discussed in the literature on machine agency 
and responsibility (Danaher, 2016; de Jong, 2019; Gunkel, 2017; Köhler, Roughley, & Sauer, 2018; 
Nyholm, 2018; Tigard, 2020).
This account constitutes a challenge to modern approaches to machine responsibility, and in 
particular the view that modern machine complexity transcends traditional accounts of responsibility 
(Matthias, 2004). The challenge consists in taking us back to the basics to show that the basics are 
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not necessarily incapable of dealing with the actions of complex machines. Along the lines drawn 
by Köhler et al. (2018), Robillard (2018) and Tigard (2020), this article concludes that the gaps that 
causes concern might, in fact, be illusory, or simply the product of applying inappropriate frameworks 
for understanding the attribution of actions. In addition to this, the Hobbesian framework contains a 
distinction between natural and artificial agents, representation and responsibility of actions, and a 
general political framework that allows for the attribution of actions to machines for pragmatic reasons.
To determine whether artificial intelligence (AI) can bear responsibility, we must first understand 
what constitutes a person, author and an actor. The Hobbesian approach provides a way of avoiding 
much current confusion and controversy by relying on an instrumental theory of responsibility and 
accountability that does not fall foul of common objections to such an approach, such as stifling 
innovation (Gunkel, 2017). It is argued that stifling innovation is at times both necessary and legitimate, 
and that the question of what risks to accept in order to achieve innovation and economic growth, for 
example, is subject to political deliberation, as innovation and growth are only two amongst many 
goals of society. At the same time, the framework allows for the consideration of non-humans as 
artificial persons, if such an approach is deemed beneficial. Machines, then, could be assigned a form 
of personhood along the lines of limited liability corporations. The Hobbesian framework also shows 
how AI can be considered artificial persons, and if such a move creates gaps, these are ancient gaps.
First, the question of attribution of machine actions is examined, along with the Hobbesian 
framework of persons and representation. Secondly, the nature of modern machines is considered, 
as their complexity is claimed to constitute a fundamental challenge to traditional approaches to 
attribution of responsibility. Thirdly, the responsibility and retribution gaps are considered in light 
of the Hobbesian framework.
Hobbes’s theory allows for a clear and arguably fair way of attributing machine action, while also 
allowing for necessary development and innovation. Responsible and beneficial innovation will be 
allowed as long as it is compatible with social order, and if the beneficial effects outweigh concerns 
about increased risk and moral hazard.
ATTRIBUTIoN oF ReSPoNSIBILITy
Modern machines are complex. They are so complex, in fact, that makers and operators of machines 
no longer understand them. Advanced machine learning and genetic algorithms are two examples 
of the techniques that are said to cause this (Matthias, 2004). This factor, some say, makes it unfair, 
unintuitive, or simply not right, to attribute responsibility for machine actions to machine makers or 
operators (Matthias, 2004). As emphasised by Tigard (2020), responsibility can entail attributability, 
accountability, or answerability. He employs a pluralistic account of moral responsibility and thus 
extends the analysis of the gaps beyond both law and questions of accountability. Accountability is 
the main focus of this article, as will become clear when the Hobbesian framework of representation 
is presented.
Attributing the actions of machines to humans is also associated with negative consequences, as it 
could stifle innovation and prevent beneficial use of new technologies (Gunkel, 2017; Matthias, 2004). 
It could even deprive people of their perceived need for retribution (Danaher, 2016). In discussing 
the gaps thus created between who has responsibility and blame and whom we attribute it to, de Jong 
(2019) argues that the complexity of the production of modern technology is yet another nail in the 
coffin for what she labels “traditional approaches” to attributing responsibility.
In this article it is argued that the traditional approach is still viable, and that objections to its use 
derive mainly from the confounding complexity of new technologies. The account here presented is 
an instrumentalist account based on the view that, when it comes to responsibility, machines are tools 
under human responsibility. The machines essentially “assist the animate being” in the realisation of 
the goals and pursuits of others (usually human beings) (Sacksteder, 1984).
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This view is similar to the views of Koops, Hildebrandt, and Jaquet-Chiffelle (2010), Bryson 
(2010), Calo (2015), Nyholm (2018) and (Tigard, 2020). They all argue in favour of traditional 
approaches involving the attribution of responsibility to human beings, and it will here be shown not 
only that these approaches can handle complexity, but also that the complexity itself is somewhat 
illusory. The goal of the article is to highlight the nature of the gaps and to show that old theories 
are fully capable of dealing with the attribution of machine actions. Furthermore, while some of the 
instrumentalist accounts reject the possibility of limited machine agency, the account here developed 
shows how robots can be considered limited agents, without necessarily being able to own their own 
actions. Also, rather than emphasising agency and the moral aspects of responsibility, it enables 
us to treat these questions as political questions informed by, but not determined by, philosophical 
considerations of moral agency.
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was a political theorist much concerned with social order 
and political legitimacy. Hobbes lived in a time of great conflict, and today he is most famous 
for his systematic approach to political philosophy, which led him to prefer the rule of few and 
to emphasize that the sovereign must have absolute authority in order to be able to provide 
security and order (Hobbes, 1946). Using the metaphor of a social contract, Hobbes argued 
that a government with absolute power could be legitimate. Our worst fear, he argues, is to live 
in fear of violent death, and civil war is the condition most conducive to produce such fear. To 
avoid this condition, Hobbes imagines that we would be willing to transfer our natural right of 
liberty to a sovereign, who would in turn allow us all the liberty that is compatible with our 
own protection. While he acknowledges that a sovereign with absolute power is not ideal, he 
argues that the downsides are less weighty than the downsides of limited power prone to produce 
instability and conflict (Hobbes, 1946).
Hobbes’ use of a contract as his mechanism for legitimate transfer of rights and power 
underscores that the ideas of representation and responsibility are important parts of his 
philosophy. For example, he discusses in detail how the social contract allows the sovereign to 
act as a representative of the individual citizens, with the possibility that a citizen is acted upon 
with his own authority (Hobbes, 1946). While the instrumental approach mainly involves seeing 
the human being as the actor, this Hobbesian notion of authorising representatives to act may also 
be applicable to machines. This would open up for a more nuanced approach to machine action 
than that of, for example, Robillard (2018), who rejects any form of machine agency (unless 
they have become proper moral agents).
While Hobbes’s focus on representation and responsibility in itself makes him an interesting 
theorist for the question at hand, the fact that he examines these issues in the case of an artificial being 
makes it even more relevant. Haugeland (1989) refers to Hobbes as the “grandfather of AI” and the 
computational mind, but it is not Hobbes’ mechanism in itself that is of most interest when discussing 
these issues. Instead, it is the fact that he considers the commonwealth an “artificial man”. When 
human beings contract and create new constellations of rights and responsibilities, this, Hobbes argues, 
“resemble[s] that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation” (Hobbes, 1946). 
Human beings can create a commonwealth, and they can also turn their own creations – machines 
of various kinds – into artificial persons, when this is deemed beneficial or necessary. This creative 
potential of human beings is emphasised by Sacksteder (1984), who writes of man “the artificer” – 
the “mechanic, who contrives machines”.
Hobbes is here used because of his concept of authority and representation, his theory of 
punishment, and his idea of the social contract as the basis of government legitimacy. The result is a 
Hobbesian (inspired by Hobbes) account of the attribution of machine action. The account highlights 
the illusory nature of both the responsibility gap and the retribution gap, and it is an instrumental 
and pragmatic theory that does not suffer from some of the common objections to instrumentalism, 
such as the stifling of innovation and the creation of gaps.
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Computer Programs and Artificial Agents
If we fast-forward more than 350 years from Hobbes’s heyday to the present age, we find ourselves 
in an era during which an artificial agent tends to evoke the idea of a computer-based entity capable 
of performing certain actions. The purpose of this article is to examine the degree to which these 
modern artificial agents are amenable to Hobbes’ older framework for regulating and understanding 
the acts of artificial persons. The analysis begins with the question: Who defeated Lee Sedol in the 
five-game Go match in Seoul in March 2016?1 Go is an ancient board game, and Lee Sedol was one 
of the best at playing it. In 2016, however, he was defeated in a game involving a computer.
In order to start the analysis Sedol’s apparent opponent must be identified: Google’s AlphaGo 
(Google, 2020a). Who, or what is AlphaGo? The choice between these two words – who/what – 
immediately reveals that the conceptual waters we traverse are rough. Who refers to a living person 
like ourselves, whereas what refers to a thing (Gunkel, 2019).
On a basic level, AlphaGo is a computer program developed by DeepMind (Google, 2020b). But 
what is a computer program, and can it be ascribed agency and the ability to play and win games? 
A computer program is created by writing code in a programming language. The code is then run 
through a compiler, which creates executable files. These files are run by a compatible operating 
system, which in turn runs on a computer. The computer running the application is, in a physical 
sense, the machine that is involved in playing.
An autonomous vehicle involves some additional aspects as well. Code is produced, compiled, 
and run by a computer; this time it is located in a mobile shell. This mobile shell can even propel itself. 
It also senses its environment and attempts to react to the stimuli received in order, for example, to 
avoid running over pedestrians. The machine that is an autonomous vehicle is thus a robot according 
to common definitions of the term (Brooks, 1991).
Thus far, we have a computer, running an operating system, running compilers which can turn 
code into executable files, which in turn become a computer program like AlphaGo or the software 
used to control autonomous vehicles.
Another creature is also involved in the process, however. The code run through the compiler 
is created by human beings.2 This could be the DeepMind team, or any other programmer. The 
computer, with its programming environment, compiler, and ability to run programs enables people 
to run a computer program. Alternatively, we could say that the humans command the computer to 
run AlphaGo.
This takes us to the central questions, where the Hobbesian notions of responsibility and 
representation are used to answer questions such as, are humans the authors of programs, and thus also 
of the actions that follow? Is the compiler a co-author, and are the operating system and the computer 
enablers? Nyholm (2018) introduces the idea of collaborative agency, and thus considers such ideas 
seriously. However, such concepts may not be necessary once we remove the veil of complexity that 
obscures modern machines.
Hobbesian Persons and owners of Actions
The veil shall be removed by way of applying a Hobbesian framework of representation. While Pitkin 
(1967) argues that Hobbes provided the first systematic English account of political representation, 
Skinner (2005) convincingly argues that this might be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, Hobbes provides 
an early influential account of representation, which is of relevance here because it entails “the act 
of speaking or acting in the name of someone else, and more specifically doing so with permission 
or authority” (Skinner, 2005). Such an account of representation allows for (a) straightforward 
attribution of action by examining the origin of an act, and (b) asking whether machines might in 
fact be representatives of human beings, instead of mere tools.
A person is defined as the origin of actions or words, either his own, or those of others (real or 
fictional). If we consider the person to be capable of owning his actions, or words, we call them a 
natural person – other persons are feigned or artificial (Hobbes, 1946). A natural person is an active 
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cause, Sacksteder (1984) argues, and can thus own actions and authorise acts by others. Koops et al. 
(2010) discuss similar concepts that have been used to examine the possibility of legal personhood 
for new entities. The debates are there traced back to the early 1990’s. The Hobbesian framework 
here presented goes a lot further back, however, and discussions and about Hobbes’s mechanism 
and automata are highly relevant for seemingly new phenomena such as robots and advanced AI 
(Sacksteder, 1984).
A person sounds quite human, so let us distance our actors somewhat from the human by returning 
to the roots of the word. While persona in Latin refers to the “disguise, or outward appearance of a 
man, counterfeited on the stage”, in Greek we have prosopon, meaning face, for the same function 
(Hobbes, 1946). In this sense, non-humans might be personas, or faces. Gunkel (2018) expounds 
upon the philosophy of Levinas and the concept of face and others, as he argues that machines might 
also have such roles. If machines are natural persons, this could indeed mean that old theories were 
vulnerable to the gaps here discussed. Furthermore, if this is the case, the need to seriously consider 
the rights of machines would also emerge (Gunkel, 2018; Robillard, 2018). However, even if machines 
are considered to be Hobbesian artificial persons, this does not imply that a gap exists, as will be 
shown. Koops et al. (2010) further states that legal personhood is a mask that serves the purpose of 
separating legal entities and “physical persons or other entities”. This highlights the role a machine 
might play by being considered an artificial person. Pettit (2001) also discusses the etymology of 
persons and the self, and refers to the Hobbesian notion that the concepts are restricted to those that 
can speak and think of themselves by “first-person indexicals”. The importance of “being able to give 
expression” of beliefs and desires matters, he states. In the Hobbesian framework here developed it 
is not argued that machines have own states of belief or desire, but their ability to express such states 
in others are considered important with regard to the role they can play as artificial persons.
One potential way of viewing such entities is to liken them to limited liability corporations – 
“legal person distinct from owners and directors, as well as a separation of ownership and control” 
– the creation of which Hobbes might himself have been involved in (Jessen, 2012). The idea of 
limited liability corporations might lead to the consideration of limited liability machines, as will 
be discussed later.
Following these conceptualizations, we can say that to personate is to represent oneself or 
someone else. Those who act can thus do so as themselves, or as another, as a representative, or 
actor (Hobbes, 1946).
The question remains, then, whether machines can be natural persons. If so, this will enable them 
to own actions. If they cannot be natural persons, they might still in some sense be artificial ones, as 
they can both convey words and perform certain actions. In this sense, they are clearly distinct from 
the most basic objects and tools. An artificial person, however, is an actor, while there is some other 
owner of the actions. These owners are natural persons. An artificial actor that has been provided 
with the right to perform some action, has authority (Hobbes, 1946). This account is thus different 
from that Robillard (2018), who argues that a robot quite simply either is a moral agent or not – a 
question that is not pursued in depth here.
In a legal sense, however, machines need not be considered persons at all. Koops et al. (2010) 
provide an extensive account of accountability and machine actions, in which they also discuss such 
questions as giving machines personhood of various kinds. Their account thus extends the theoretical 
debates in this article into the legal domain – a domain Tigard (2020) opted not to discuss as he 
emphasised a pluralistic moral approach. The purpose of the current article, however, is to highlight the 
illusory nature of the consequences of machine complexity, while also providing a deeper theoretical 
framework for analysing questions such as retribution and the role of the political domain when it 
comes to trade-offs between, for example, innovation and safety.
This takes us to the application of the Hobbesian account of machine responsibility. For 
our example of the Go game, we need to determine whether or not AlphaGo is the author or the 
representative of an author of the games played. Or neither. If AlphaGo is an artificial person – a 
International Journal of Technoethics
Volume 12 • Issue 1 • January-June 2021
92
representative of some person who is the author of the moves it plays – the actions of AlphaGo are 
the actions of this other person. The question, then, is whether a machine can own the actions it 
performs, and be a natural person, or at least a corporation-like limited liability person. Answering 
these questions involves coming to grips with the complexity of modern machines.
THe CoNFoUNdING VeIL oF CoMPLeXITy
The main argument of this article is that we are confounded by complexity. This refers to the idea that 
it somehow matters whether humans can foresee the actions of the machines they make, as “automated 
systems are making decisions that cannot be fully controlled or predicted” (de Jong, 2019). The 
machines are, Matthias (2004) states, unpredictable in principle for their creators. However, this (a) 
is not true, and (b) would not matter.
There are certain key technologies involved in the creation of AlphaGo, and machine learning 
and genetic algorithms seem to be particularly to blame for the confusion that has arisen (Matthias, 
2004). AlphaGo is not taught to play the game of Go well by human experts of the game. Instead, it 
is programmed to learn how to play well by human experts on machine learning.
The people involved in the DeepMind team could not foresee the moves AlphaGo would play, 
as these were well beyond even the capacity of top human players’ understanding of the game (Metz, 
2016). This is arguably one cause of the responsibility gap some perceive. While the gap is often 
discussed in terms of culpability, here it involves the attribution of praise. If the mechanisms behind 
the success of DeepMind are not properly understood, it somehow seems wrong to state that someone 
who is not an expert in the game of Go should be given credit for beating one of its top champions 
by way of a machine.
However, it is wrong to say that the actions of AlphaGo are in principle unpredictable. They 
are practically unpredictable, because of limited human cognitive powers. But if we could imagine 
a human being with superior cognitive powers, such a being could understand the machine learning 
processes and predict the outcomes, in principle. Robot actions are “fully constitutive of the 
programmer’s decisions and intentions” (Robillard, 2018). This is similar to the view of automata as 
the manifestation of its makers purposes and goals. They have no intent, no will, and their “movements 
are not [their] own” and these movements are not mystical or disconnected from human responsibility 
(Sacksteder, 1984). Saying otherwise turns AI into something mysterious. But “AI is not magic” – it 
is the application of known principles of mathematics, statistics and engineering (Marcus & Davis, 
2019). However, even if a machine does not understand anything, and is neither mysterious nor 
magical, it can to a certain degree act, and there is nothing, in theory, preventing us from providing 
it with limited legal personhood in accordance with such abilities, according to Solum (1991).
The remaining question, then, is: does it matter that a machine is unpredictable? An example can 
help in answering this. Say person X writes a computer program that each minute randomly chooses 
between the number 0 or 1. X then attaches the machine to a real gun and aims it towards the street 
outside their house. Whenever the machine chooses 1, the trigger is pulled, and a bullet is fired. 
There are usually few people walking by X’s house, but one day a police officer shows up at their 
door, wondering what happened to cause the death of the person on the pavement outside their house.
“Oh, that must have been my machine!”, X would say.
“I see,” the police officer states in surprise, “You should come with me, then.”
“But it was not me”, X replies, “I had no idea when it would shoot.”
The intent of the example should be clear by now. X has made a machine that could not be 
fully predicted or controlled once they had decided to turn it on and deploy it. But does this, in any 
meaningful way, absolve X of responsibility, or blame? It does not, and the example illustrates the 
confounding complexity of AI and machine learning. Although these technologies are more complex 
than that of a random killing machine, the principles involved are exactly the same. We can use some 
set procedure for identifying the human being deserving responsibility, such as the one proposed 
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by Nyholm (2018). This is similar to the arguments of Köhler et al. (2018), who argue for human 
responsibility in such cases. An example involves the application of autonomous weapons, where 
some human is considered to be the commander responsible – the one in control of the application 
of the weapons, but not in practical control of every action of the sophisticated weapons.
One important aspect to consider is the incentives created by our rules and regulations. If we state 
that a machine (or any other form of) unpredictability absolves an actor of responsibility, we may be 
creating great incentives for not creating transparent and explainable AI. In the Ethics Guidelines for 
Trustworthy AI, transparency is considered one of the core requirements for achieving trustworthy 
AI (High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2019). One aspect of transparency is 
explainability, which entails a requirement that “the decisions made by an AI system can be understood 
and traced” by humans (High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2019). Unpredictability 
would not absolve a creator of AI of responsibility if the criterion of explainability were made a legal 
requirement. However, such a move would most likely involve a trade-off that led to the creation of less 
effective and more predictable machines (High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2019). 
A full discussion of such implications is beyond the scope of this article, but it suffices to note that if 
explainability is not formally required, there are clear incentives not to prioritize the development of 
explainable AI, and these incentives are further intensified by the claim that unpredictability absolves 
a creator of responsibility. Furthermore, it might also create the incentive to state that a machine is 
unpredictable and unexplainable, even if it may not be. This is a classic example of a situation in 
which absolving humans of responsibility for machine actions constitutes a moral hazard. The natural 
persons involved would then not bear the full cost of the actions of the machines, and they would 
thus be incentivised to increase the risk taken.
The Confounding Questions
The questions discussed here involve many different terms, most of which cannot be fully developed 
in this setting. Hobbes was very concerned about the confusion caused by such issues, and a reader 
of Hobbes is struck by his constant definitions of new terms, as he systematically builds his political 
philosophy (Hobbes, 1946). This is because language is a tricky beast, and words often lead us astray. 
Hobbes says words can be the “money of fools,” who value them by the authority of others (Hobbes, 
1946). He even goes so far as to list speech and language as fundamental causes of human conflict, 
because they allow us to represent “that which is good in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness 
of good; and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and 
troubling their peace at their pleasure” (Hobbes, 1946).
The confounding complexity of machine action is partly a result of the lack of proper definitions 
and uniform use of language. This is why some perceive gaps, for example, in the attribution of praise 
and blame (moral attribution) when machines perform actions. Many of the fundamental questions 
related to machine action sound simple, but they are in fact quite complex. To exemplify, if I run my 
robot mower, have I mowed the lawn? If I buy and start my Roomba, have I vacuumed?
Most would say that X pounded the nail into the board if X used a hammer. But does this 
change if X connects the hammer to the random triggering mechanism and then stepped away and 
watched the hammer shoot nails approximately every other minute? The chains of causality are 
more complex, and the distance from the action is increased, but nothing has really changed in 
terms of responsibility. Matthias (2004) argues that the spatial link between the action and the one 
responsible is broken, and Koops et al. (2010) aims to answer if the law is equipped to deal with 
such an increased physical distance between machines and those that employ them. The example of 
the random triggering mechanism shows, however, that the spatial aspect is of no importance for the 
attribution of responsibility.
The question that started it all was Who beat Lee Sedol? If X programmed AlphaGo, did X beat 
Lee Sedol in Go? Or is somehow X’s Go playing program suddenly a natural or artificial person 
capable of owning its own actions? There is nothing to suggest that it is. The complexity of the 
International Journal of Technoethics
Volume 12 • Issue 1 • January-June 2021
94
machines is confusing because it allows individuals to use one skill (engineering/programming) to 
excel at another skill (i.e. Go-playing).
Saying that a human programmer with mediocre Go skills beat Lee Sedol in Go feels wrong, 
because they’re not very skilled at playing Go. But this feeling does not matter, and attributing praise 
to them is appropriate – not because of their Go-playing skills, but because of their programming 
skills. This skill has become a universal skill that enables those who possess it to excel in most areas 
of human action.
It is akin to a physically weak person building an exoskeleton with immense power, allowing them 
to beat the world’s strongest man in a competition of strength. Have they really then beaten him? In 
principle, yes, without question. There is no collaborative agency involved – no one with whom to 
share the glory – even if the exoskeleton did much of the literal lifting (Nyholm, 2018). The same goes 
for AlphaGo, which lifts intellectually; it is all the same, in principle. These questions, and questions 
regarding who is responsible for deaths caused by remote-controlled, or even autonomous, drones 
are the same as the question of who is responsible for the removal of dirt by a (mostly) manually 
operated excavator.
However, if the rules of the competition of strength prohibited exoskeletons, they would have 
won by cheating. And this is where the rules of the game come into play – the guidelines and best 
practices, but first and foremost: politics and the law.
ReSPoNSIBILITy ANd ReTRIBUTIoN
The first question involved in determining machine responsibility is whether machine complexity 
changes things or whether the Hobbesian concept of responsibility, and traditional notions of law, 
are capable of dealing with machines such as autonomous vehicles and programs playing games 
(Koops et al., 2010).
First, the law must describe a required process of diligence on the part of anyone who decides to 
deploy some machine in settings where they may impact other beings or the environment. Secondly, 
the law cannot proactively and specifically approve or decide what machines are allowed, unless one 
wishes to drastically change the dynamics involved in innovation and development. Matthias (2004) 
is correct in arguing that innovation should not be excessively disrupted. We must rely on general, 
strict laws of liability, and developers and entrepreneurs must be allowed to deploy new technologies 
subject to these rules. However, they must also be expected to adhere to strict norms of responsibility 
in development and entrepreneurship. In this respect, I support Calo (2015) and Nyholm (2018) and 
refer to them for more detail.
Instrumental accounts of responsibility will necessarily make developers cautious, as it reduces 
or eliminates the moral hazard associated with absolving developers of responsibility for cost of the 
risk related to their machine’s errors and unpredictability. The chilling effect on innovation is one of 
the concerns addressed by Matthias (2004) and Gunkel (2017). However, while strict liability norms 
will make developers cautious, this is a good thing. The argument for less strict laws of liability seems 
to be based on the potential societal and economic benefits of more rapid innovation. This argument, 
however, is deeply problematic and requires careful consideration of the ethical foundations adhered to.
Pure utilitarianism might surely allow for reckless innovation at breakneck speeds, but there are 
alternatives to such an ethic – a Hobbesian ethic, for example, in which legitimacy is based on the idea 
that people create the sovereign in order to protect their primary interest, which is their own safety 
and survival. Once created, the government has a duty to protect these rights for all individuals and 
cannot simply apply utilitarian principles to sacrifice the safety of some so that others can acquire 
more wealth, for example. This is where the liberalism of individual liberty and the liberalism of free 
markets, innovation and progress, exhibit their quite different natures.
However, a Hobbesian framework will accept innovation that is responsible and beneficial for 
social order and prosperity. That is why we need the traditional framework of representation and 
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responsibility, as it allows for transparent, controlled and responsible development and implementation 
of new technologies.
Responsibility Gap
The responsibility gap is said to arise from the rationale that creators and operators cannot fully 
understand complex machines and thus cannot be held responsible for the effects of such machines. 
The gap is also said to result from a physical disconnect between humans and machines with varying 
degrees of autonomy (Matthias, 2004). Tigard (2020) relates this gap to “absent, unknown, or 
nonexistent sources of harm”. However, the gap is illusory and caused in part by the veil of complexity.
There is no law that specifies that people cannot build a random killing machine, but it would 
still obviously be a crime to deploy it as was done in the example above. Building it is no crime, but 
deploying it would be. This is important for the question of attribution of responsibility. Level of 
control might not be as important. Let us assume that a person, Y, goes bow shooting in the middle of 
a crowded square and happens to miss the target and kill a bystander. An opponent, Z, uses a sniper 
rifle and manages to hit their target. Who would argue that Y is less responsible for their actions than 
Z would have been had they missed and shot someone, just because Y chose to use a device with 
littler accuracy – over which they had little control? It was Y’s choice to use the device in this setting, 
and they bear the full responsibility, despite their lack of control.
A more practical example involves two different autonomous vehicles. One is highly advanced and 
fully autonomous, while the other is simply equipped with a basic set of assistive features and safety 
features. Assume that these cars exist in a situation in which autonomous vehicles are not prohibited 
or highly regulated, and that the responsibility is determined by traditional traffic law. Person A uses 
his low-tech vehicle and causes no accidents. Person B, however, enables all the automatic features 
in his car and leans back in his seat to get some reading done. Their vehicle runs into a novel and 
confusing situation, and it so happens that it runs over a group of pedestrians. When the police 
arrive, the driver denies all responsibility. The car, he states, is so advanced that he had no idea what 
it would do, and his intention was only to get to work. The car is highly advanced, and when set free 
in a complex environment, its actions are practically unpredictable. However, using such a car is the 
equivalent of shooting with a highly inaccurate weapon in a public square, and the unpredictability 
involved implies no absolved responsibility.
Matthias (2004) also suggests that since the procedure of machine learning involves using errors 
as a method, we get a responsibility gap. This implies that people cannot be responsible for the errors 
that they cannot foresee. However, there is nothing controversial about saying that a person who 
chooses to use error as a method is clearly responsible for the consequence of such errors. When a 
machine fails, falls, errs, or does something that the maker did not intend, it will be a faulty machine, 
and not the machine it was intended to be. But the reason for this is the failure of design, and not the 
result of some mystical form of internal motion or magical agency in the machine, as an “automaton 
is moved according to the design built into it by the artificer”, even if these designs are based on 
randomness, error, or unpredictability (Sacksteder, 1984). In a recent study it is shown that experts 
in the field of AI attributes responsibility to machines, in part due to the unpredictability of modern 
AI (Orr & Davis, 2020). While interesting, this shows that there may exist a perceived responsibility 
gap, and that people will perceive machines as responsible. Such phenomena do not create a real 
responsibility gap, however, just as the fact that people will become angry at, and maybe even strike, 
a door that they bumped their toe into, does not mean that the door is to blame.
Imagine an autonomous vehicle set free on the streets to learn to drive by trial and error. It 
seems clear that anyone who decided to do this is clearly liable for the consequences caused by this 
infant vehicle. For these reasons, innovative law and regulation must be examined, in order to allow 
for responsible innovation and development of AI. In Norway, for example, autonomous vehicles 
can be tested when deployed in limited ways, through the application of “regulatory sandboxes”. 
These are already in place for transportation and financial technology, and a regulatory sandbox for 
International Journal of Technoethics
Volume 12 • Issue 1 • January-June 2021
96
developing responsible AI solutions that respects privacy regulations is being developed (Ministry 
of Local Government and Modernisation, 2020; The Norwegian Data Protection Authority, 2020). 
Such mechanisms allow for (a) innovation and development, (b) limitation of public risk, and (c) the 
application of standard notions of responsibility and attribution of actions.
The rules of the game determine the attribution of responsibility. If playing Go with any sort 
of assistance is allowed, a player can win with the assistance of AlphaGo. If someone launches an 
autonomous vehicle, responsibility for accidents becomes a matter of examining (a) due process in 
development and (b) decision of how, when and where to deploy it. The modification of machines must 
naturally also be regulated, and this is an area of great importance for further research. Developers 
cannot always be held responsible for third-party modification or user “hacks”, and this becomes 
increasingly relevant as the interplay between software and hardware, and for example open source 
software, is combined in machines deployed in society.
The author of an action is considered responsible for consequences in this framework. However, 
the real world is more complicated than this, and when complex chains of persons and things are 
involved in causing an outcome, the question of responsibility becomes difficult to disentangle, as 
de Jong (2019) argues.
There are several ways of attributing responsibility, and Carter (1999) distinguishes between four 
approaches: Causal attribution, intentionality, moral attribution or moral culpability (Carter, 1999). 
Tigard (2020) provides an account of the gaps based on a pluralistic conception of moral responsibility 
and has developed the implications of the different accounts in more detail. The current undertaking 
does not necessitate a full account of all the concepts, and they will be discussed only briefly to 
highlight the necessity of being explicit about which conception one adheres to.
Danaher (2016) prefers the causal approach, and thus opens for attributing responsibility 
to machines. This approach, however, is deeply problematic. First of all, where do we stop our 
investigations into the prior causes of an event (Sætra, 2019)? Furthermore, if intentions do not 
matter, all accidents can perfectly well be attributed to some person, even though this is not desirable 
for moral or legal reasons. Intentions should somehow matter, some might argue, but intentions are 
neither epistemologically available to us nor sufficient grounds for moral attribution. Roads paved 
with the best of intentions are positive contributions, but carelessness and recklessness can warrant 
liability despite good intentions.
Moral attribution is the approach that most fully captures all the required elements involved in 
the attribution of machine responsibility. It involves attribution of responsibility based on what we 
expect of an actor in terms of their due consideration of their own actions and acting in accordance 
with a certain set of norms. This relates to the norms of responsibility (Nyholm, 2018). I do not 
consider the criterion of moral culpability, which involves a moral evaluation of whether the actions 
performed were right or wrong (Carter, 1999).
In sum, Matthias’s (2004) starting point – the attribution of responsibility to the creators or 
operators, according to how some machine was deployed, maintained, and the level of quality control, 
is still a workable concept. Nyholm (2018) provides a useful set of responsibility loci based on this 
traditional approach and demonstrates the political applicability of this approach. Furthermore, much 
work in responsible AI and robotics involve attempts to increase accountability, transparency, and the 
traceability of error in AI and robotic systems (Raji et al., 2020; Winfield & Jirotka, 2017). While such 
work is important, the argument here made is that a lack of transparency does not absolve a designer 
of duty. Rather, in order to further the development of transparency and explainability, designers of 
opaque original systems should be held fully accountable for any actions they cannot demonstrate 
not to result from their designs.
Retribution Gap
The responsibility gap, however, is not the only gap. Danaher (2016) introduces the retribution gap, 
which is the “mismatch between the human desire for retribution and the absence of appropriate 
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subjects of retributive blame”. This is also discussed by Tigard (2020) as part of the responsibility 
gap, and he discusses, for example, anger, blame, and desire for retribution when two fictional lorries 
– one with a human driver, and one automated – runs over a child.
While interesting, a Hobbesian approach addresses both the concerns raised in Danaher’s quote. 
First, the “human desire for retribution”, and retribution itself, is not regarded to be the basis of 
punishment. Punishment, for Hobbes, is never about retribution. It is about correcting behaviour and 
providing beneficial incentives (Hobbes, 1946). In fact, much political philosophy is based on the need 
to escape from the effects of human needs for retribution. This aspect of human nature is important, 
but not for the reasons Danaher (2016) seem to imply. The experienced need for retribution cannot 
be the guide of policy regarding punishment, but must instead be tempered and downplayed. Danaher 
(2016) states that the responsibility gap arises from respecting the human need for retribution. Since 
this is not an aspect of Hobbesian justice, this gap is of little relevance in this context, even if it may 
be true in a descriptive sense.
Secondly, by assigning responsibility in the manner just described, there are subjects of blame: 
human beings; not machines that are assumed to be responsible because they arbitrarily happened 
to be positioned wherever our quest for causal factors ended. The retribution gap is partly the result 
of attributing agency and responsibility to machines. However, with the Hobbesian framework for 
assigning responsibility, there is no need for robot moral agency; not even joint or collaborative 
agency (Nyholm, 2018). These questions may be both morally and philosophically interesting, but 
with regard to the current question of responsibility, we need not consider robot moral agency at all; 
particularly if we remain in the realm of reality and the current status of AI (Marcus & Davis, 2019).
If an autonomous vehicle were judged responsible for accidents, and punished, many people 
would certainly find this both wrong and absurd. However, this is somewhat similar to the attribution 
of blame to other artificial persons: corporations (Jessen, 2012; Wellman, 2012). Corporations are 
at times held responsible for the actions of the people they comprise, and in this respect we can 
see a similar mismatch between the law and people’s intuitive feelings of blame and retribution. A 
company might go bankrupt, but the people that are felt to be responsible may walk away scot-free.
It thus appears that the retribution gap is nothing new and is thus not necessarily specifically 
related to complex machines. If the traditional model of attributing responsibility to artificial persons, 
such as limited liability corporations, is seen to be the most desirable model for society, such a model 
is still compatible with the Hobbesian framework here described. People’s feelings of injustice would 
only matter if they become so strong as to destabilise the system. People’s need for retribution would 
thus be respected in the sense that it is dangerous. If their need for retribution is thwarted, they might 
reject the system and circumvent it. This, however, is quite different from arguing that the human 
need for retribution must be respected as valuable, and that it should be promoted and acknowledged 
fully in, for example, law.
Such a system can also accommodate limited liability machines, just as we have limited liability 
companies, if that is deemed the best way to preserve people’s fundamental interests and rights. In 
this context, the political realism of Hobbes (1946) allows us to justify such trade-offs in a political 
setting. However, such a move would involve the creation of clear moral hazards. The questions of 
contract, personhood, and the legal domain are discussed in depth by Koops et al. (2010), who argue, 
broadly along the lines of the arguments made in this article, that it may make sense to consider 
machines “restricted” persons, but that natural personhood for machines does not seem to be a relevant 
solution for the foreseeable future.
CoNCLUSIoN
The complexity of new machines entails that humans cannot “anticipate, completely control, or 
answer for” their actions, states Gunkel (2017). The first seems to be practically true, but the second 
is wrong if we also consider control in terms of development and deployment. This, in turn, entails 
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that the third is simply not correct. The argument made in this article is that the veil of complexity 
obscures the responsibility of human beings. When this veil is removed, it becomes apparent that 
modern machines are, in principle, not different from more primitive machines, which most people 
seem to believe our moral and legal theories can easily accommodate.
When it is argued that AI and robots should be responsible, this does not relate to machine 
responsibility. Responsible AI means that AI should be attributed responsibility just as little as 
transparent AI means that machines should be see-through. But in order for us to correctly attribute 
responsibility for machine actions, explainable AI would be beneficial. Despite this – explainable 
or not – the developers and/or operators of machines are responsible for their actions. They run the 
risk if they employ machines that are not transparent and explainable. Any other solution involves a 
clear moral hazard. We can certainly hope for some degree of responsibility on behalf of the makers 
of AI. However, should they act irresponsibly, our laws are in place to intervene. These are based in 
large part on principles similar to the ones in the Hobbesian framework presented here, and these 
principles are fully capable of dealing with complex machinery.
This framework is also capable of accommodating limited liability machines. This does not entail 
a consideration of robot capabilities, however, and we need not get into the demands of consciousness, 
intentionality, feelings, etc. necessary for a machine to be attributed some form of personhood (Koops 
et al., 2010). This would also not involve the “moral danger” of having to consider machine rights, 
etc (Robillard, 2018). These would be nothing more than legal fictions created for the sake of specific 
social benefits, just as limited liability corporations. If it is done, this is because debates in the political 
domain have led to the acceptance of some moral hazard and risk in order to achieve other political 
benefits, such as, for example, innovation and welfare. The Hobbesian framework is a realist one, 
in that such trade-offs can perfectly well be made, but it also entails a full theory of legitimacy and 
individual rights, which are parts of Hobbes’s philosophy not covered here (Hobbes, 1946).
Complexity confounds, but it does not really change anything. When we remove the veil covering 
our modern machinery, we can see that they are not new magical creations capable of disrupting 
traditional notions of responsibility. They are both very useful and potentially very dangerous, and 
this implies that the human responsibility for such machines must be emphasised, not eroded. Even if 
machines should be granted legal personhood in some form, this is done in order to achieve societal 
benefits, and human responsibility for the machines remains intact – society would merely have 
decided to share it.
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eNdNoTeS
1  Also asked by Gunkel (2017).
2  The code could also be written by a machine, which in turn was created by human endeavour. Matthias 
(2004) also considers machine-written code, but I consider such code also as ultimately attributable to 
human beings.
